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The Polysemy of Privacy 
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.∗ 
“The Polysemy of Privacy” considers the highly protean nature of the concept 
of “privacy,” which extends to myriad disparate legal interests, including 
nondisclosure, generalized autonomy interests, and even human dignity. For a 
concept of such central importance to many systems of protecting fundamental 
rights, its precise contours are surprisingly ill defined. This lack of determinate 
meaning is not limited to the concept of privacy in the United States; virtually all 
legal systems that utilize privacy (or its first cousin, “dignity”) have difficulty 
reducing the concept into specific, carefully delineated legal interests. In some 
respects, privacy means everything—and nothing—at the same time. Moreover, 
even in those contexts where one can identify privacy at a relatively choate, rather 
than highly abstract, level of jurisprudential analysis, the right of privacy often 
comes into direct conflict with other fundamental rights. For example, 
commitments to freedom of speech and to a free press often conflict with privacy 
interests; these conflicts, in turn, force courts to secure one interest only at the 
price of undermining another. In the United States, unlike in the wider world, 
protecting privacy interests through tort law generally will give way to advancing 
concerns associated with securing expressive freedoms. This Article considers 
some of the causes and effects of the privileging of expressive freedom over 
privacy/dignity in U.S. constitutional law and suggests that comparative legal 
analysis of the concept of privacy might help us to better understand both what 
privacy does mean and also what it should mean. 
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INTRODUCTION: POLYSEMY AND PRIVACY 
Sometimes we use the same word to indicate different things. For example, in 
standard American English, the word “play” can carry several meanings, including 
a noun (a theatrical production or a single round in a sporting event) or a verb (a 
diverting activity, often associated with children). Even though spelled and 
pronounced identically, the word simply means different things in different 
contexts. “Ball” is another example of a polysemous word; it can refer to a 
spherical object, a formal dance, or, more generically, a good time (i.e., “we had a 
ball last night”). 
Like “play” and “ball,” the concept of “privacy” can be used to refer to multiple 
legal concepts. Privacy can refer to an autonomy interest; that is to say, the right to 
do or refrain from doing something. In the United States, the right to terminate a 
pregnancy is an aspect of a constitutional right of privacy that relates mainly to 
autonomy interests.1 But this is hardly the only way one might conceptualize the 
idea of privacy. Indeed, it arguably is a rather odd construction of the word, given 
that privacy in nonlegal contexts usually denotes seclusion or nondisclosure, rather 
than more generalized autonomy interests. 
In fact, privacy logically can and does refer to an interest in not disclosing 
personal information; the historical roots of the right of privacy in the United States 
relate to this aspect of the concept. Warren and Brandeis, in their iconic article in 
the Harvard Law Review,2 argued that the common law of torts should protect an 
interest in nondisclosure of certain true but embarrassing personal information.3 
Although the law of defamation traditionally provided an economic recovery only 
for the dissemination of damaging but false information, Warren and Brandeis 
argued that the law of tort also should provide a recovery for the dissemination of 
true information that was harmful to personal or business interests in the absence of 
some significant public interest supporting disclosure of the information.4 Their 
argument proved persuasive, and most states recognized a right to recover damages 
associated with the public disclosure of private facts.5 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965). 
 2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 3. See id. at 205–14. 
 4. See id. at 211–19. 
 5. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1892–95 (2010) (discussing the incorporation of privacy torts in 
various states during the period 1899 to 1940). Richards and Solove note that “by 1940, 
privacy had been recognized in only a distinct minority of U.S. jurisdictions—by common 
law in twelve states (California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) and by statute in 
only two others (New York and Utah).” Id. at 1895. After publication of William Prosser’s 
pathbreaking 1941 treatise and subsequent iconic law review article on the four distinct torts 
of privacy, WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941); William 
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960), many more jurisdictions adopted privacy 
torts. See Richards & Solove, supra, at 1901 (“In the little more than two decades since the 
publication of his first torts treatise in 1941, Prosser’s conception of tort privacy had become 
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These examples—privacy as autonomy and privacy as nondisclosure—also 
highlight an important distinction in the use of the concept in both the United States 
and Europe: whether legitimate privacy interests primarily implicate protection of 
“privacy” (however defined) against the government, against other private citizens, 
or against both the government and other citizens. In other words, is privacy 
something we demand from the government or something we demand from each 
other and private corporations? To be clear, a fully theorized understanding of 
privacy should encompass protection against both the government and private 
actors that unduly seek to compromise a reasonable interest in either autonomy or 
nondisclosure. Yet, I think that a tendency exists in the contemporary United States 
to think about privacy primarily as running against the government, rather than 
against other citizens and private corporations. 
Although the proposition is contestable, I want to suggest that, in the 
contemporary United States, most citizens understand privacy interests to implicate 
both nondisclosure and autonomy rights against the government; by way of 
contrast, privacy law does relatively little to protect citizens against each other or 
against corporations that seek to collect and sell personal information that arguably 
fits within the scope of the Warren and Brandeis concerns.6 In the contemporary 
European Union, on the other hand, privacy concerns are as much about securing 
personal information from other private interests, including both other citizens and 
corporations, as they are about autonomy claims against the government.7 
The Fourth Amendment, for example, serves as a general framing device for 
privacy discourse in the United States; police officers may not search an 
                                                                                                                 
a majority doctrine.”). 
 6. In fact, the situation is even worse than this preliminary assessment would suggest; 
even in those circumstances where state courts or state legislatures act to create privacy 
protections that limit—or even prohibit—the disclosure of personal information, the First 
Amendment, and more specifically the commercial speech doctrine, make the validity of 
such privacy protection open to serious constitutional doubts. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668–72 (2011); see also infra notes 37–45, 137–39, and accompanying 
text. 
 7. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative 
Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 681 (2007) (“True, 
European privacy law promotes interpersonal respect among individuals. But it also protects 
privacy against the state.”); Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee 
E-mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from 
Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 829, 866 (2005) (“European countries have formulated an 
all-encompassing cultural and legal response to privacy-based actions as compared to the 
United States, which continues to delineate a sharp distinction between private and public 
workplaces.”); Yohei Suda, Monitoring E-mail of Employees in the Private Sector: A 
Comparison Between Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 209, 248 (2005) (“Overall, Europe considers the right to privacy, including data 
protection, to be fundamental, even in the workplace.”); Flora J. Garcia, Comment, Bodil 
Lindqvist: A Swedish Churchgoer’s Violation of the European Union’s Data Protection 
Directive Should Be a Warning to U.S. Legislators, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1205, 1206 (2005) (“The different approaches to privacy in the United States and 
the European Union are deeply rooted in traditions much broader than the concept of 
privacy, such as the role of government in private life, the role of the press, and the freedoms 
that are afforded to the media generally.”). 
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individual’s home, person, or effects without a warrant, and no warrant may issue 
except upon a showing of probable cause.8 The Supreme Court of the United States 
has exhibited an amazing talent for finding exceptions and exemptions from the 
general warrant requirement,9 but Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not the most 
relevant consideration for immediate purposes. Instead, the most immediately 
relevant point is that the Fourth Amendment helps to frame the culture’s 
expectation of privacy as an interest running against the state.10 The generalization 
of privacy via the rubric of substantive due process did nothing to alter this focus 
on government, rather than private entities, as the principle threat to a generalized 
interest in personal autonomy and self-definition. 
One last introductory point merits attention: even if legislators and state court 
judges charged with updating the common law of torts11 wished to protect privacy 
with respect to public disclosure of private facts, the First Amendment would 
present a substantial obstacle to the project.12 A robust doctrine of protection for 
speech and press rights, arising under both the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 9. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). But cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that a law enforcement 
officer’s placement of a GPS tracking device on a private car constitutes a “search” of 
private property under the Fourth Amendment and requires a warrant); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that if police obtain evidence in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, such evidence must be categorically excluded from the trial of the defendant in 
order to deter future Fourth Amendment violations). 
 10. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3 (“Whatever new methods of investigation may 
be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have 
constituted a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, 
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected 
area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 11. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3–5, 12–23, 35–
43, 81–83, 164–71 (1982) (arguing that courts should use their traditional common law 
powers, “the common law function,” to “update” the law, including areas governed by 
statutes, at least in circumstances where a particular statute has fallen into “desuetude,” i.e., 
when the law in question no longer “fits the legal landscape” and is “out of phase with the 
[legal] topography”). As Judge Calabresi explains, “the judicial common law would attach to 
statutory rules that are out of phase just as much as to common law precedents or doctrines.” 
Id. at 166. To be clear, Judge Calabresi acknowledges that the task of legal updating is 
properly shared by both courts and legislatures; a problem arises, however, when legislatures 
fail to regularly update laws that have ceased to play any useful role in the governance of 
contemporary society. See id. at 2–7. 
 12. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668–72 (2011) (rejecting a 
privacy-based justification for a Vermont law protecting the confidentiality of physicians’ 
prescription data by prohibiting the distribution of this information for marketing purposes 
and instead holding that the First Amendment protects the sale of such information to 
pharmaceutical companies for their use in targeted marketing efforts called “detailing”). 
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of the First Amendment, has gone a great way toward obliterating both judicial and 
legislative efforts to secure privacy rights against nongovernmental actors.13 
Just as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan14 radically limited the scope of 
defamation law in the United States in the service of creating a more robust 
marketplace of ideas, the same doctrine has also limited the ability of states to 
impose money damages for the disclosure of truthful information that causes harm. 
This makes sense, obviously enough: if public disclosure of false information 
enjoys a constitutional license, how could one withhold protection for disclosure of 
truthful but embarrassing information? The constitutionalization of tort law remains 
an important structural limit on any efforts to secure privacy rights against 
nongovernmental actors. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence remains very much a work in progress, as demonstrated by the 
Court’s recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps.15 
But the U.S. indifference to privacy as an interest in need of protection from 
private actors goes well beyond the limits flowing from Sullivan; even in instances 
where no serious constitutional right to publish confidential information exists,16 
neither Congress nor state legislatures seem much inclined to act. Accordingly, the 
surreptitious collection of private information regarding web surfing habits, or 
medical records, is generally legal. If a person uses a web search engine such as 
Explorer or Firefox in the United States, the company providing that web browser 
may collect and store a user’s searches. So too, a commercial website such as 
Amazon, Ebay, or Facebook, may generally collect, bundle, and sell information 
collected from users of the company’s site. 
In the United States, under the state action doctrine, any rights of privacy arising 
under the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clauses simply have no 
application with respect to private companies.17 Although Congress or a state 
legislature could enact positive legislation protecting privacy interests in these 
contexts, such legislation generally does not exist. To a degree that likely seems 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–35 (2001) (citing and applying 
precedents limiting the scope of tort law to provide financial recoveries for the dissemination 
of information, even false information, pertaining to public officials, public figures, and 
matters of public concern). 
 14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 15. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Phelps holds that highly targeted protest, aimed at inflicting 
maximum emotional harm, is nevertheless protected speech and cannot serve as the basis of 
imposing tort liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress or intrusion upon 
seclusion (a privacy tort) if the speech activity at issue addresses a matter of public concern 
and otherwise takes place lawfully. See id. at 1215–20. But see id. at 1222 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for 
the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”). 
 16. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) 
(holding that Sullivan does not privilege publication of false information about a matter that 
does not constitute a matter of public concern or involve a public official or public figure and 
that a state may impose tort liability on a standard of fault lower than Sullivan’s “actual 
malice” standard). 
 17. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in 
Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 
(1995) (discussing and critiquing the United States Supreme Court’s theories of state action). 
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remarkable to European eyes, privacy interests against nongovernmental entities 
are regulated, if at all, by the marketplace. 
In sum, the legal concept of privacy in the United States is narrowly defined as 
implicating rights against the state, and important questions regarding 
nondisclosure with respect to nongovernmental actors remain largely unanswered 
by either legislatures or courts. The fact that U.S. law does not comprehensively or 
reliably protect all aspects of privacy does not mean, however, that other polities 
must ask the same questions about privacy—or give the same answers.18 
For example, the European Court of Human Rights, in the context of privacy 
rights, has expressly held that signatories to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”) 
have a duty to protect European Convention rights from private, nongovernmental 
forms of abridgement: 
The Court recalls that although the object of Article 8 [the right of 
privacy] is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the 
State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily 
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for private or family life.19 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights does not rely on the concept of state 
action to strictly limit the scope of rights secured under the European Convention; 
the relative weakness of U.S. privacy law protections against nongovernmental 
actors simply does not hold true in other democratic nations committed to securing 
the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights.20 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the U.S. approach is self-evidently wrong 
or misguided. Instead, my point is a more limited one: consideration of how other 
nations’ legal systems address privacy issues could help us to better understand and 
appreciate with greater specificity and clarity the relevant issues involved and the 
viability of various approaches to safeguarding the “right to be let alone.”21 
This Article considers the polysemous nature of privacy and attempts to unpack 
and identify substantive, procedural, and cultural issues essential to securing 
privacy interests effectively. Part I begins with an analysis of the protean nature of 
privacy and attempts to identify, with some particularity, some of the interests that 
the concept properly encompasses and the limited scope of protection that these 
interests presently enjoy in the United States.22 Part II then takes up the importance 
of the public/private dichotomy to securing privacy rights; this Part argues that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See, e.g., X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 239–40, 
¶ 23, 241, ¶ 27, 242, ¶ 30 (1985) (holding that Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms may require signatory states to 
adopt “measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations 
of individuals between themselves”). 
 19. Id. at 239. 
 20. See infra notes 97–117 and accompanying text. 
 21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193. 
 22. See infra notes 30–57 and accompanying text. 
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privacy law in the United States would benefit significantly if U.S. lawmakers and 
judges were to think more carefully and consistently about the problem of private 
power being used to burden—or even abridge—privacy interests.23 At the same 
time, however, the cultural salience of privacy might constitute an inhibiting factor 
in using statutes and judicial decisions to protect privacy more robustly against 
nongovernmental actors. 
The Article considers the impact of the First Amendment’s Free Speech and 
Press Clauses on the potential scope of privacy protections in Part III. Simply put, 
even if the U.S. federal government or particular state governments attempted to 
better secure privacy interests against abridgment by nongovernmental actors, the 
First Amendment would impose serious limitations on the scope of such legal 
reforms.24 Part III also examines the radically different baseline that prevails in 
contemporary Europe with respect to these issues and questions. Under the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, privacy interests in Europe 
can and often do take precedence over the exercise of expressive freedoms.25 These 
boldly contrasting approaches demonstrate quite clearly that the U.S. approach 
does not represent the only potential means of accommodating a strong 
commitment to expressive freedoms with a concomitant and equally robust 
commitment to protecting privacy interests. 
Part IV analyzes the possible benefits of using alternative nomenclature that is 
more communitarian than “privacy” to safeguard privacy interests.26 More 
specifically, this Part considers the German approach to securing privacy interests, 
an approach generally framed in terms of securing “human dignity” and “free 
development of the personality,” rather than “privacy” as such.27 This Part posits 
that adopting more communitarian legal constructs might be conducive to securing 
broad, group-based legal protection for privacy interests. At the same time, 
however, in the United States, the use of privacy in lieu of broader, more 
communitarian legal concepts probably is not a mere accident of history. Moreover, 
Part IV proposes that a group-based approach to securing privacy interests might be 
less viable in a polity, like the United States, that features a pervasive distrust of 
government as a central part of its political identity.28 
Finally, this Article concludes by accepting and embracing the polysemous 
nature of privacy.29 The Conclusion nevertheless cautions that the potentially 
infinite breadth of the concept of privacy can endanger the successful protection of 
the interests it seeks to safeguard. Polysemy, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing, 
but imprecision in the definition of a fundamental human right can and will make 
its enforcement significantly more difficult; in addition, imprecision or vagueness 
in the contours of a fundamental human right presents real difficulties for reliably 
securing that right globally. By considering the disaggregated legal interests, issues, 
institutions, and cultural factors associated with defining and protecting privacy—
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See infra notes 58–78 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 79–98 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 99–117 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 118–39 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 140–62 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text. 
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and doing so in an overtly comparative legal analysis—we will stand a much better 
chance of effectively securing these important interests from both governmental 
and nongovernmental threats. 
I. PRIVACY AS NONDISCLOSURE, AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY 
In their seminal 1890 law review article, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis posited that the law of tort should provide some measure of protection 
against the public disclosure of private facts.30 They argued that “the right to be let 
alone” should enjoy formal legal protection and suggested that “[o]f the 
desirability—indeed of the necessity—of some such protection, there can, it is 
believed, be no doubt.”31 
After surveying the law of property and copyright, Warren and Brandeis argued 
that a reasonable extension of then-existing law could create a zone of protection 
against the disclosure of private facts.32 In the end,  
[t]hese considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection 
afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the 
medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing 
publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more 
general right of the individual to be let alone.33 
Thus, recognizing a right against the publication of private facts without permission 
provides legal protection akin to “the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right 
not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be 
defamed.”34 
From a European perspective, however, the notion that disclosure of private 
facts without permission might give rise to liability is entirely quotidian. Once an 
incident of aristocratic privilege, the protection of personal honor and dignity later 
democratized so that, in theory, all persons are potentially deserving of honor and 
respect. Such protection is a baseline principle of the civil law of Germany and 
France (and has been for a very long time).35 
As Professor James Q. Whitman puts the matter, in Europe, legal systems 
tended to level everyone up, whereas in the United States, we have “leveled 
down.”36 Moreover, “[t]o say that America has absolutely no law of civility is to 
say too much. But to say that in general America has no law of civility—especially 
as compared with a country like Germany—is to make the right generalization.”37 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193–96. 
 31. Id. at 193, 196. 
 32. See id. at 197–206. 
 33. Id. at 205. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1279 (2000) (discussing the protection of personal honor in the civil law of France and 
Germany and contrasting this protection with the approach in the United States). 
 36. See id. at 1285, 1319–21, 1344, 1358–59, 1387 (emphasis omitted). 
 37. Id. at 1384 (emphasis omitted). 
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In contrasting U.S. and German law on the protection of honor with respect to 
personal insult, Whitman observes that “[t]his is a body of law that shows, in many 
of its doctrines, a numbness to free-speech concerns that will startle any 
American.”38 
In thinking about the protection of privacy in transatlantic terms, I think a key 
distinction that must be addressed is the utter absence of mandatory civility norms 
in the United States. Under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, one is 
free in the United States to engage in targeted insult, with the aim of 
“assassinating” the character of a public official or public figure, with complete 
legal impunity.39 One is equally free to drop the f-bomb in a public school board 
meeting with parents and even children present40 or to wear a jacket emblazoned 
with “Fuck the Draft” in a public courthouse.41 Whether one attempts to fix liability 
on a theory of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or even 
invasion of privacy, in the United States the claim will fall to concerns about 
ensuring the public debate regarding public officials, public figures, and matters of 
public concern is “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”42 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held that government may not 
prohibit or punish publication of truthful information of public concern, even if that 
information was not lawfully secured in the first instance.43 In invalidating the 
application of a federal law that prohibited publication of unlawfully taped 
telephone conversations, the Supreme Court explained that, in the context of 
defamation, “neither factual error nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the 
two, sufficed to remove the First Amendment shield from criticism of official 
conduct.”44 The Justices “[thought] it clear that parallel reasoning requires the 
conclusion that a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”45 
Although the precise scope of a “matter of public concern” is not entirely clear, 
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court thought it virtually self-evident that a 
dispute about a public school district’s negotiations with a teachers union fell 
within the scope of the category: “[t]he months of negotiations over the proper 
level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Id. at 1312. 
 39. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–55 (1988); see also infra 
note 150 (discussing Larry Flynt’s stated motives in publishing a fake Campari ad in Hustler 
magazine). 
 40. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902–03 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (The majority vacated and remanded for reconsideration, where the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, in State v. Rosenfeld, 303 A.2d 889 (N.J. 1973), held the remark was 
protected because it did not and was not likely to incite a breach of the peace.); see also 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (overturning conviction for use of opprobrious 
language to a police officer). 
 41. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Cohen v. California: “Inconsequential” Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251 
(1996). 
 42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 43. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–35 (2001). 
 44. Id. at 535. 
 45. Id. 
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unquestionably a matter of public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in 
debate about that concern.”46 As Justice Stevens, writing for the Bartnicki majority, 
explained, “That debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that 
inspired Justice Brandeis’ classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less 
worthy of constitutional protection.”47 
Thus, even a brief and somewhat cursory analysis of the impact of the First 
Amendment’s free speech and free press guarantees immediately establishes the 
difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of securing a broad-based right of privacy 
as nondisclosure, even if U.S. legislatures or courts were inclined to create such 
protection. In the post-Sullivan era, the “right to be let alone” has little doctrinal 
bite; it essentially protects against the disclosure of private facts that do not relate 
to a public official, a public figure, or a matter of public concern. By definition, 
however, almost anything that a newspaper or a television station wishes to report 
is a “matter of public concern,” else why would the media outlet seek to report on 
the matter in the first place? In sum, the First Amendment seriously limits the 
ability of government to secure personal privacy as nondisclosure. 
The European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, as 
well as domestic constitutional courts, such as Germany’s 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), have been much more 
sympathetic to the protection of personal information with respect to all citizens, 
including public officials and public figures, than has the Supreme Court of the 
United States.48 In cultures that believe that all persons have an inherent right to the 
protection of personal honor and dignity, securing privacy as nondisclosure is not 
merely an important but rather an essential project.49 By way of contrast, however, 
in a place like the United States, which really lacks any legal recognition of 
mandatory civility norms,50 it should not be surprising that privacy as nondisclosure 
receives so little formal legal protection. 
One also should note that the protection of false statements of fact makes U.S. 
law radically out of step with most of the world. In places like Germany and Japan, 
the law of libel permits recovery for the publication of true statements that damage 
personal reputation in the absence of a countervailing public interest in 
dissemination of the information.51 In other words, before Sullivan even enters the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (citation omitted). 
 48. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 
15, 1999, 101 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 361 (Ger.) 
(“Princess Caroline”) (finding that the publication of some contested photos of the Princess 
would violate her privacy rights under the German constitution but refusing to enjoin the 
publication of others), overruled in part by Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 
40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2005) (holding that the German court’s ruling was insufficiently 
protective of the Princess’s privacy rights under Article 8 of the European Convention). 
 49. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 457 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
 50. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1219–20 (2011). 
 51. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101–18, 155–
64 (2006); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Defamation in the Digital Age: Some 
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picture, U.S. law devalues privacy by protecting the disclosure of truthful 
statements that degrade or embarrass the subject, even in the absence of a 
particularly good reason for protecting the disclosure. When one adds Sullivan and 
Bartnicki to the equation, the balance in favor of publication becomes 
tremendously skewed in favor of vindicating the interests of the press and would-be 
voyeurs as opposed to “the right to be let alone.” 
Indeed, if publication of private facts is really little different than a physical 
assault in its potential emotional and psychological effects on the subject 
(victim?),52 taxing the entire social cost of such publication against the subjects 
seems highly questionable. Yet, this is precisely how the First Amendment’s 
mandate affects the ability of both the federal and state governments to provide a 
right of recovery for violations of privacy interests. 
Finally, it bears repeating that a general legal culture uninterested in securing 
privacy interests undoubtedly helps to explain the lack of constitutionally 
permissible statutory general privacy protections. Even though legislative action to 
secure privacy with respect to public officials and public figures and regarding 
matters of public concern has been significantly curtailed under the First 
Amendment, substantial privacy protections could be, but have not been, enacted in 
the United States. In other words, the “Wild West” legal and political culture 
generally does not provide privacy protections even when the First Amendment 
would not stand in the way. 
Consider, for example, the common practice of web browsers and websites 
collecting (“mining”) data from those using the websites. The First Amendment 
would not impose any serious barrier to a law requiring mandatory disclosure of 
such practices, regulation of the practices (including a ban on data mining without 
the subject’s overt and voluntary consent), or even a flat ban on such practices.53 
                                                                                                                 
Comparative Law Observations on the Difficulty of Reconciling Free Speech and Reputation 
in the Emerging Global Village, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 348–50 (2005) [hereinafter 
Krotoszynski, Defamation in the Digital Age]. 
 52. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205–07. 
 53. But cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668, 2672 (2011) (invalidating, 
notwithstanding a strong privacy-based justification for the statute, a Vermont law that 
protected the privacy of physician and patient prescription data by prohibiting the sale of 
such data to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes). To be sure, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for the Sorrell majority, did credit the general importance of protecting 
privacy interests. See id. at 2672. Even so, however, he squarely rejected Vermont’s privacy 
defense, noting that when seeking to safeguard privacy interests, “the State cannot engage in 
content-based discrimination to advance its own side of the debate.” Id. On the other hand, 
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Elena Kagan, found that Vermont’s desire to protect the privacy of physicians’ prescribing 
practices constituted a significant government interest. See id. at 2682 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“And this Court has affirmed the importance of maintaining ‘privacy’ as an important 
public policy goal—even in respect to information already disclosed to the public for 
particular purposes (but not others).”). He also found that Vermont’s statute was sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to survive First Amendment judicial scrutiny. See id. at 2683 (“The record 
also adequately supports the State’s privacy objective.”); id. (“[T]he statute serves a 
meaningful interest in increasing the protection given to prescriber privacy.”). Justice 
Breyer, however, was merely writing in dissent, whereas Justice Kennedy wrote for the 6-3 
Sorrell majority. See id. at 2658–59. 
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Congress has not enacted such a law, nor have most state legislatures. As a 
consequence, data mining and resale of personal information gathered from the use 
of web browsers and websites is regulated, if at all, by the market itself.54 This 
provides even more evidence of privacy as nondisclosure’s relative lack of cultural 
salience in the contemporary United States. 
The U.S population’s general distrust of government and government 
institutions no doubt provides at least a partial explanation for this lack of privacy 
protection through the civil and criminal law—and also helps to explain the 
absence of mandatory civility norms more generally.55 If one believes that 
government routinely abuses its powers, permitting government to create and 
enforce mandatory forms of politesse could be deeply unsettling. A government 
empowered to decide when offensive speech “goes too far” could use this authority 
to systematically squelch speakers and viewpoints that it finds disagreeable or 
troublesome (whether or not the particular modality of the speaker’s expression 
actually transgresses generally held notions of privacy, dignity, or civility).56 By 
deploying the First Amendment to disallow mandatory civility norms, in the 
service of safeguarding privacy and even human dignity, this risk of abuse of 
discretionary government power can be, and is, completely avoided. But at what 
cost? I do not suggest that the U.S. approach is wrong or misguided; my point is a 
more limited one. We should be careful to weigh both the benefits and costs of 
disallowing legal protections for privacy, dignity, and personal honor rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Some commentators, such as Professor Fred Cate, argue that reliance on the market 
and competition will ensure adequate protection of personal data and also meaningful choice 
for consumers. See Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European 
Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173, 223–24, 231 (1999). This claim is open to 
doubt. For market-based privacy protections to be effective substitutes for regulatory 
protections, two conditions would first have to exist. First, consumers would have to be 
actively engaged and make some effort to obtain information about privacy policies and then 
use this information when deciding which browsers or websites to patronize. Second, even if 
consumers could be relied upon to use information about privacy policies to shape their 
online behavior, the policies themselves would need to be readily available and written in 
easy-to-understand language. Neither condition appears to exist in the contemporary United 
States. 
 55. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 56. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Questioning the Value of Dissent and Free Speech 
More Generally: American Skepticism of Government and the Protection of Low-Value 
Speech, in DISSENTING VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 209, 213, 215–19 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2012) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, Questioning the Value of Dissent] (arguing that pervasive 
distrust of government better explains U.S. free speech theory and practice than other, more 
purposive theories of the First Amendment); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot 
(Not) Heard ’Round the World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the 
Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28–34 (2010) 
[hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Shot (Not) Heard ’Round the World] (positing that pervasive 
mistrust of government explains both structural and substantive limitations on the scope of 
government power in the United States and noting that other polities do not exhibit this same 
level of skepticism toward the government and its institutions). 
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simply and reflexively accepting their absence as a necessary cost of securing the 
freedom of speech and the press.57 
It also bears noting that the U.S. approach, which utilizes a broad prophylactic 
ban on government efforts to enforce mandatory civility norms, represents a radical 
break with the prevailing legal approach in the wider global legal community. Even 
if, after careful consideration of the merits, the United States decides to stick to its 
guns, this disjunction with prevailing standards in other democratic polities will 
certainly produce legal frictions, and these conflicts of values will arise with greater 
regularity in our more globalized marketplace of ideas. 
II. PRIVACY AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY 
Professor Owen Fiss has cautioned repeatedly that in thinking about expressive 
freedom in the United States all too often we frame the project solely in terms of 
vigilance against government efforts at censorship.58 He persuasively argues that 
we risk the vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas if we permit private corporations 
to exercise unlimited censorial powers through the use of unregulated market 
power.59 If Google, for example, were to block a particular website, this form of 
private censorship might well prove far more effective at limiting access to the 
information and ideas contained on the website than would a government law or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. See JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT (2008). 
 58. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412–
16 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 
(1992); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787–91 (1987). As Fiss 
states the proposition, “The state should be allowed to intervene, and sometimes even 
required to do so, . . . to correct for the market.” Fiss, Why the State?, supra, at 791. 
 59. See Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 58, at 794 (“In another world things might be 
different, but in this one, we will need the state.”); Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 
supra note 58, at 1415 (“Just as it is no longer possible to assume that the private sector is all 
freedom, we can no longer assume that the state is all censorship.”). To be clear, Professor 
Fiss does not repose reflexive faith in the state as a force for good; instead, he suggests that 
we should not simply assume that all exercises of private power to regulate the marketplace 
of ideas will reliably advance the project of democratic self-governance. As he explains his 
point, “it [is] fair to say that in a capitalist society, the protection of autonomy will on the 
whole produce a public debate that is dominated by those who are economically powerful.” 
Id. at 1412. Accordingly,  
[t]he market—even one that operates smoothly and efficiently—does not assure 
that all relevant views will be heard, but only those that are advocated by the 
rich, by those who can borrow from others, or by those who can put together a 
product that will attract sufficient advertisers or subscribers to sustain the 
enterprise. 
Id. at 1412–13. From this vantage point, government interventions in the market can enhance 
rather than degrade the marketplace of ideas by countering the ill effects of a monopoly or 
oligopoly of voices. See, e.g., Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, supra note 58, at 3 (“Most 
radicals do not have the funds to buy airtime, the networks are reluctant to sell airtime to 
them anyway, spokespersons for the underprivileged do not have the capital to buy a 
newspaper or television station, and coverage of protest activities is circumscribed by the 
economic imperatives that drive the privately-owned media and today enfeeble public 
broadcasting.”). 
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regulation imposing criminal or civil penalties for disseminating or reading the 
content. 
Notwithstanding Professor Fiss’s cogent arguments in favor of rethinking the 
free speech project in terms of greater regulation of private power over the 
marketplace of ideas, most U.S. lawyers, judges, academics, and citizens think of 
rights almost exclusively as running against the state rather than against 
nongovernmental actors (such as publicly traded corporations). This same 
phenomenon exists with respect to privacy rights: in the United States, we tend to 
think of privacy rights running against the state rather than against each other.60 
To be sure, some statutory provisions secure privacy rights in limited contexts. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),61 for 
example, contains provisions that protect the confidentiality—and therefore the 
privacy—of a patient’s medical records.62 But a law cannot change cultural habits 
and concerns (or, in the case of privacy, a lack of concern). In practice, HIPAA’s 
privacy rule simply reduces to a new patient being furnished with a sheet of paper 
from her medical care provider stating the HIPAA privacy protection rule but then 
immediately asking for a general release so that the provider may communicate 
with medical insurance companies, and others, to obtain benefits on behalf of the 
patient. Virtually all patients simply sign this form, thereby waiving a substantial 
portion of their HIPAA rights. Physicians’ offices do not invite discussion or 
negotiation about the content or scope of these waivers. Although I have never 
personally tested the proposition, one suspects that if a would-be patient were to 
refuse to sign the waiver form as written, she would probably be denied service. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. But cf. X and Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 235, 239–41, 
¶¶ 21–27 (1985) (holding that the privacy rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms include 
protection against private behavior that burdens or transgresses Article 8 because signatory 
states have a duty to secure Convention rights within society generally and not simply a duty 
not to violate them directly through government action). In fact, many European nations, 
including Germany, maintain legal systems under which the state itself not only must refrain 
from violating fundamental human rights but which require the state to promote respect for 
these interests within society more generally. See Krotoszynski, Defamation in the Digital 
Age, supra note 51, at 349–50 (discussing the German doctrine of secondary effect and the 
Basic Law’s (Grundgesetz) application to purely private interactions between 
nongovernmental entities); see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional 
Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) (discussing and distinguishing legal systems that 
observe constitutional rights solely in negative terms, i.e., as running solely against the state 
itself, and legal systems that recognize and enforce “positive” constitutional rights, i.e., 
rights that the state has an affirmative duty to secure for its citizens). 
 61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.) (codified at various points as 
amendments or additions to the Social Security Act). For a skeptical overview of HIPAA’s 
effectiveness at securing patient privacy, see Brian Zoeller, Note, Health and Human 
Services’ Privacy Proposal: A Failed Attempt at Health Information Privacy Protection, 40 
BRANDEIS L.J. 1065 (2002). 
 62. For a discussion of the privacy protections that the HIPAA privacy rule provides, 
see Health Information Privacy, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/consumers/index.html. 
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To be clear, one should not understate the value of HIPAA or other statutory 
protections of privacy interests against nongovernmental actors; rather, the point is 
that even when legislative bodies in the United States act to convey privacy 
protections by statute, these statutory rights often lack cultural salience and quickly 
morph into relatively meaningless forms of legal boilerplate. 
Again, the contrast with Europe seems striking. For example, European websites 
are far more serious about representing the private nature of the transaction. As 
Professor Paul Ohm notes, the European Union’s (EU) data privacy regulations are 
“famously privacy-protective.”63 Undoubtedly, this greater respect for securing 
personal information and data is not solely the product of voluntary self-regulation 
but instead relates rather directly to the European Commission’s extensive 
“directives” (administrative regulations) on protecting the privacy of personal 
information.64 Even so, however, the question of the chicken and the egg remains: 
are privacy regulations stricter in Europe because of cultural expectations, or do the 
regulations themselves help to order and shape privacy expectations of individuals 
residing within the EU? Whatever the precise causation, European privacy 
protections at the EU level are much broader, and stricter, than the corresponding 
enactments at the federal and state level in the United States.65 
Moreover, the comprehensive protection of personal honor and dignity, as 
significant legal concepts within the domestic tort law of many European nations, 
also reflects a much higher social importance for the protection of privacy interests 
in Europe than in the United States. In other words, Europeans seem to take far 
more seriously the need to secure nondisclosure rights against other citizens and 
nongovernmental entities than do most U.S. citizens (and the federal and state 
governments). 
The degree of the public/private disjunction in privacy concerns remains strong 
in the contemporary United States. For example, the Bush administration’s 
domestic spying program was remarkably controversial;66 both average citizens and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010). 
 64. Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 
(EU). The European Union is currently drafting a new directive that will revise, update, and 
expand its privacy regulations. European Comm’n, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) (2011), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/eu-
com-draft-dp-reg-inter-service-consultation.pdf (proposing a new data protection 
regulation); see Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US 
Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 178 (2012) (noting that the EU is revising and 
updating its privacy directive); Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of 
Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2012) 
(same). 
 65. See Cate, supra note 54, at 196 (“When compared with the omnibus, centralized 
data protection of the EU directive and member states’ national laws, U.S. privacy protection 
stands in stark contrast and to some observers seems to pale altogether.”). For a general 
overview of European privacy protection regulations, see id. at 180–95. 
 66. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Man for All Seasons: Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. 
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members of Congress were greatly angered by the notion that the government 
might be wiretapping telephone calls between U.S. residents and citizens of another 
nation.67 Congress conducted oversight hearings and extensive press coverage of 
the controversial policy reported on each new disclosure regarding the program; the 
program and its discovery were, in fact, front page news in the nation’s leading 
newspapers.68 
In the end, however, rather than condemn the domestic spying program or 
punish those responsible for it, Congress instead passed legislation in 2008 that 
conveyed retroactive immunity on telephone companies that facilitated the 
domestic spying program—with the support of then-Senator Barack Obama.69 In 
other words, U.S. politicians saw more political upside in granting blanket 
immunity to the telephone companies that cooperated with a warrantless 
wiretapping program after the fact (despite the absence of any judicial safeguards 
for the program) than in creating mandatory new privacy protections that would 
force the federal executive branch to seek judicial approval for such monitoring 
programs or, looking at the question from the nongovernmental side of the ledger, 
imposing civil liability on the private telecommunications companies that 
voluntarily cooperated with the arguably unlawful domestic spying programs. 
Moreover, ostensibly “liberal” or “progressive” politicians, including the putative 
nominee of the Democratic Party for President, supported this approach.70 
Such an outcome in Europe, if not completely unthinkable, comes very close to 
being so. This is not because governments in Europe are intrinsically more virtuous 
or have a higher regard for freedom, but rather because the political consequences 
of such a program would be utterly disastrous. Once again, culture informs law. 
                                                                                                                 
and the Quest to Secure the Rule of Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 165, 169–72 (2009); W. Bradley 
Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 
1338–41 (2009). 
 67. See, e.g., Emily Arthur Cardy, Note, The Unconstitutionality of the Protect America 
Act of 2007, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 171, 171–73 (2008). 
 68. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 
1215 (D. Or. 2006); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Demands 
Records About Warrantless Spying by National Security Agency (Dec. 20, 2005), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/23150prs20051220.html. 
 69. See Shailagh Murray, Obama Joins Fellow Senators in Passing New Wiretapping 
Measure, WASH. POST, July 10, 2008, at A6 (noting Senate passage of “legislation to 
overhaul government eavesdropping rules in terrorism and espionage cases and [that] 
effectively granted immunity to telecommunications companies that participated in a secret 
domestic spying program, ending a contentious debate that has raged for more than two 
years” and reporting that “[a]mong the 69 senators who voted ‘yes’ on final passage was 
Barack Obama”). 
 70. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Early Test for Obama on Domestic Spying 
Views, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A17 (“As a presidential candidate, he condemned the 
N.S.A. operation as illegal, and threatened to filibuster a bill that would grant the 
government expanded surveillance powers and provide immunity to phone companies that 
helped in the Bush administration’s program of wiretapping without warrants. But Mr. 
Obama switched positions and ultimately supported the measure in the Senate, angering 
liberal supporters who accused him of bowing to pressure from the right.”). 
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Similarly, most U.S. users of commercial web browsers and Internet service 
providers do not think twice about the placement of cookies on their computers 
(including “zombie” cookies that cannot be removed or eradicated by simply 
clearing a web browser’s memory cache), the tracking of their searches and 
purchases, or other commoditization of their use of the Internet. The Wall Street 
Journal has run a series of investigative journalism pieces on privacy that 
document systematic and widespread privacy abuses by various segments of the 
web;71 this muckraking, at least to date, appears to have landed with a thud. 
Although the Obama administration and some members of Congress have proposed 
an Internet users’ Bill of Rights,72 including some mandatory privacy protections, 
nothing has happened.73 
Again, in the United States, the notion of an invasion of privacy generally runs 
against the federal government, not so much against private companies such as 
Microsoft or Google. As a consequence, very little data privacy protection—even 
of a sort that would probably not implicate the First Amendment—exists at either 
the federal or state level. Instead, to a remarkable—indeed unwise—degree, in the 
contemporary United States we rely almost entirely on market competition to 
ensure even a modicum of privacy protection for our personal information, data, 
and Internet browsing habits. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Julia Angwin, Big Issues: Technology (A Special Report)—How Much Should 
People Worry About the Loss of Online Privacy?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2011, at B7; Julia 
Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking: Stealthy ‘Supercookies,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2011, at 
A1; Julia Angwin & Jeremy Singer-Vine, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal 
Investigation: The Selling of You, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2012, at C1; Julia Angwin & Emily 
Steel, What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: Web’s Hot New Commodity: 
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2011, at A1; Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, 
What They Know: A Wall Street Journal Investigation: Race is On to ‘Fingerprint’ Phones, 
PCs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010, at A1; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s Cutting 
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Wall Street Journal’s excellent investigative journalism efforts with respect to online privacy 
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that currently seek to benefit from online revenue streams have something of a conflict of 
interest with respect to reporting on how websites maximize revenue by minimizing users’ 
privacy and data protection. 
 72. See Hayley Tsukayama, What’s the ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’?, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 
2012, at A11 (describing the Obama administration’s proposal and the seven general 
principles that legislation embodies, including “individual control,” “transparency,” “respect 
for context,” “security,” “access and accuracy,” “focused collection,” and “accountability”); 
Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Emily Steel, President Pushes Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 
2011, at B1 (“The Obama administration plans to ask Congress Wednesday to pass a 
‘privacy bill of rights’ to protect Americans from intrusive data gathering, amid growing 
concern about the tracking and targeting of Internet users.”). 
 73. See Jasmin Melvin, Web Privacy Guarantee? Critics Remain Skeptical, CHI. TRIB., 
Feb. 24, 2012, § 2, at 3; Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. and White House Push for Online Privacy 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at B8. To be sure, some commentators were skeptical of 
this legislation’s prospects for success from the beginning. See Tsukayama, supra note 72 
(“But there are some doubts about whether comprehensive legislation will make it through 
Congress, particularly in an election year. There are a handful of privacy bills that have been 
introduced this session but have failed to gain much traction.”). 
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And, again, if one broadens the question and asks, “in the United States, could 
government act to secure privacy, dignity, and personal honor from private 
invasion?,” the answer would be no in many important circumstances. With respect 
to public officials, public figures, and information that relates to a matter of public 
concern, the media would have a strong claim to constitutional protection for the 
dissemination of this information, even if it were purloined, provided that the 
media entity publishing the information was not itself responsible or complicit in 
the theft of the information. 
A contretemps involving the disclosure of Justice Antonin Scalia’s personal 
information, including his home address, phone number, bank, and e-mail address 
demonstrates just how deeply U.S. antipathy to privacy (as nondisclosure) 
protection seems to run. At an academic conference, Justice Scalia made public 
comments disparaging of the need for privacy protections;74 in turn, Joel 
Reidenberg, a Fordham Law School professor, tasked his seminar students with 
using public databases to learn all that they could find about Justice Scalia.75 The 
results were remarkable: “[a]mong its contents are Nino’s home address, his home 
phone number, the movies he likes, his food preferences, his wife’s personal e-mail 
address, and ‘photos of his lovely grandchildren.’”76 
After a popular legal blog, Above the Law,77 posted a story about the seminar 
students’ success in ferreting out confidential information about Justice Scalia, the 
Justice responded publicly to the breach of his privacy: 
I stand by my remark at the Institute of American and Talmudic Law 
conference that it is silly to think that every single datum about my life 
is private. I was referring, of course, to whether every single datum 
about my life deserves privacy protection in law. 
 
It is not a rare phenomenon that what is legal may also be quite 
irresponsible. That appears in the First Amendment context all the time. 
What can be said often should not be said. Prof. Reidenberg’s exercise 
is an example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment. Since he 
was not teaching a course in judgment, I presume he felt no 
responsibility to display any.78 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See Kashmir Hill, What Fordham Knows About Justice Scalia, ABOVE THE LAW 
(Apr. 22, 2009, 5:30 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/04/what-fordham-knows-about-
justice-scalia/. Justice Scalia mocked the notion that privacy laws should secure personal 
information against involuntary disclosure: “‘Every single datum about my life is private? 
That’s silly,’ Scalia [said].” Id. 
 75. See Kashmir Hill, Justice Scalia Responds to Fordham Privacy Invasion!, ABOVE 
THE LAW (Apr. 29, 2009, 9:52 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/04/justice-scalia-
responds-to-fordham-privacy-invasion/. 
 76. Hill, supra note 74. 
 77. ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com; see also Carol Beggy & Mark Shanahan, 
Names, BOS. GLOBE, May 10, 2008, at B10 (describing Above the Law as a “widely read 
legal blog”). 
 78. Hill, supra note 75. 
2013] THE POLYSEMY OF PRIVACY 899 
 
Thus, even after a group of law students demonstrated that important personal data 
could easily be obtained and published from public databases, Justice Scalia stood 
by his guns, arguing that the law should not universally protect personal 
information from involuntary disclosure. This provides useful evidence of how 
deep the indifference (antipathy?) toward privacy rights runs in the contemporary 
United States. 
III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS 
Points of tangent plainly do exist about the meaning and scope of the right of 
privacy. Most legal systems have incorporated a set of tort rules designed to 
safeguard personal reputation, for example, whether denominated rules about 
“privacy,” “human dignity,” or even a more generalized “right to free development 
of the personality.”79 In the United States, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe, 
a general consensus exists that a just society should offer some measure of 
protection, under the civil law, to each person’s interest in reputation, dignity, and 
privacy.80 So far, so good—when we talk about privacy as protection of reputation 
and human dignity, we are speaking about a common commitment, something that, 
if not a universal human value, comes quite close to it. 
Even here, however, our ability to speak meaningfully about privacy suffers a 
substantial setback from the radically different baselines that inform our respective 
domestic legal systems’ treatment of this interest when interests associated with 
privacy and human dignity conflict with values associated with expressive 
freedoms, such as the right to free speech or to a free press. In the United States, the 
imperative value of freedom of speech serves as a kind of absolute trump card, and 
state tort law protections routinely fail when challenged on First Amendment 
grounds. 
Consider, for example, the recent Phelps81 decision from the Supreme Court of 
the United States. The Reverend Fred Phelps and members of his Westboro Baptist 
Church (“Westboro”) hail from Topeka, Kansas and are active proselytizers; Phelps 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German 
Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1925 (2010); see also GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1–2 (Ger.). 
 80. See generally NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1–5, 11–31, 60–90, 154–183, 202–228 (Andrew T. Kenyon & 
Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (discussing privacy law and principles in Australia, Canada, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and in Western Europe more generally); Daniel B. Garrie, 
Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Rebecca Wong & Richard L. Gillespie, Data Protection: The 
Challenges Facing Social Networking, 6 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 127, 129–30, 136–41 
(2010) (discussing existence of data protection regimes potentially applicable to data located 
on social networking sites in Australia, Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and under the regulations of the European Union); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, It’s All About 
Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Obligations in Global Privacy and E-Transactions 
Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (2007) (noting the existence of “omnibus” privacy 
protection regimes in many nations, including “Canada, Japan, Argentina, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, and Australia”). 
 81. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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and his congregation firmly believe that God is punishing the United States for 
tolerating an increasingly licentious society. In particular, greater social and legal 
tolerance for sexual minorities seems to cause Phelps and his followers a 
tremendous degree of anxiety. In order to call attention to the imperative of 
arresting these cultural and legal trends, Westboro stages highly offensive targeted 
pickets at the funerals of deceased military personnel.82 
Albert Snyder’s son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed while 
on active duty in Iraq; his funeral took place in Westminster, Maryland.83 Phelps 
and six of his congregants traveled to Westminster for the specific purpose of 
protesting at Matthew Snyder’s funeral. Brandishing signs with slogans like “God 
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “God Hates Fags,” and “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,”84 the protest took place contemporaneously with, and proximate to, 
Matthew Snyder’s funeral services.85 
Following Westboro’s offensive funeral picket, Albert Snyder initiated a civil 
tort action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for “defamation, publicity 
given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon 
seclusion, and civil conspiracy.”86 The jury found for Snyder on his claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil 
conspiracy, awarding $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in 
punitive damages; the federal district judge subsequently reduced the punitive 
damages award to $2.1 million, but otherwise upheld the jury’s verdict.87 On direct 
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit completely invalidated the 
jury award, holding that the speech at issue enjoyed full protection under the First 
Amendment.88 The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of 
Appeals. 
Writing for the 8-1 majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the First 
Amendment essentially immunizes speech in a public forum, related to a matter of 
public concern, from serving as the basis for tort liability. On the first point, 
whether the speech related to a matter of public concern, Roberts noted that 
“Westboro had been actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its 
picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no 
serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent its ‘honestly believed’ 
views on public issues.”89 Having decided this issue in favor of Phelps, the 
remaining question was whether the First Amendment shielded Westboro’s speech 
from civil liability for invasion of privacy. 
Chief Justice Roberts found that the speech enjoyed the full protection of the 
First Amendment, and held that a standard for civil liability based on the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See id. at 1213. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1214. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 221–22 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011). 
 89. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)). 
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“outrageousness” of speech comes too close to empowering a “heckler[’s] veto.”90 
He explained: 
Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of 
public concern, that speech is entitled to “special protection” under the 
First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is 
upsetting or arouses contempt. “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.”91 
This outcome appears to leave little, if any, breathing room for the application of 
privacy torts, at least if the speech at issue falls within the rubric of a “matter of 
public concern,” is otherwise lawful, and takes place in a traditional public forum. 
Moreover, the gravamen of both the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and privacy claims relates to the outrageousness of the speech or the intrusion upon 
privacy. Chief Justice Roberts specifically rejected this legal standard, at least in 
this context, because “‘[o]utrageousness,’ however, is a highly malleable standard 
with ‘an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose 
liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their 
dislike of a particular expression.’”92 That a civil jury might take such a step by 
imposing civil liability on an unpopular speaker or group constitutes an 
“unacceptable” risk and, accordingly, “the jury verdict imposing tort liability on 
Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.”93 
The Court then proceeded to disallow the imposition of liability based on the 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion or civil conspiracy.94 Chief Justice Roberts rejected 
the argument that mourners at the funeral of a dead soldier constitute a captive 
audience and the related argument that the state has a right to protect such a captive 
audience from outrageous or offensive speech.95 
The net effect of Phelps is to extend the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan96 line of 
cases displacing state tort law principles to reach highly offensive, targeted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Id. at 1219; see HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–
41, 145 (1965). Professor Kalven has generally been credited with inventing and first using 
the concept of the “heckler’s veto.” See Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 
58, at 1416–17. However, the concept of a “heckler’s veto” arguably related back to Justice 
Douglas’s majority opinion in Terminiello and Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Feiner. 
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326–29 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1949). 
 91. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)). 
 92. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1219–20. 
 95. See id. 
 96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 
(1991); Hustler, 485 U.S. 46; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Time, 
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
For a thoughtful—and highly influential—discussion of the central importance of the New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan line of cases to the project of democratic self-government, see 
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protests, if the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern. More 
specifically, Phelps has the effect of extending Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell97 
to include plaintiffs who are not public officials or public figures, but whose cause 
of action involves liability premised on speech relating to a matter of public 
concern. This represents a major displacement of traditional state tort law to 
accommodate an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”98 debate about public 
affairs. 
Yet, the speech here, as Justice Alito observed in dissent,99 seemed intentionally 
targeted to inflict maximum emotional pain, and to do so in a way that seriously 
intruded on a quintessentially private moment—the funeral of a deceased family 
member. Justice Alito argued that “[i]n order to have a society in which public 
issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow the 
brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner [Snyder].”100 The question that 
presents itself, then, is whether a commitment to the freedom of expression requires 
a polity to forbear from enforcing, whether through criminal or civil law, 
mandatory civility norms designed to protect the privacy, dignity, and personal 
honor of its citizens. 
To be sure, the Phelps majority sees this as a relatively easy question. Chief 
Justice Roberts claims that an open and free marketplace of ideas requires that civil 
juries enjoy no greater power to censor than local police or city officials: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of 
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the 
facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. 
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful 
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. 
That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its 
picketing in this case.101 
But, to a large degree, the Phelps majority opinion, as well as the larger New York 
Times line of precedent, seems to assume that the costs of outrageous, and even 
objectively false, speech must be borne by those against whom it is directed. Yet, 
this constitutes a very distinctly American solution to the problem of reconciling a 
                                                                                                                 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. Kalven famously quoted Alexander Meiklejohn, 
another iconic scholar of the First Amendment, as describing the Sullivan decision as an 
“occasion for dancing in the streets.” Id. at 221 n.125. 
 97. 485 U.S. at 50–51. 
 98. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. 
 99. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1222–26 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 1229. But cf. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 601, 624–32 (1990) (arguing against imposing liability for speech based on an 
“outrageousness” standard not because highly offensive speech has significant social value, 
nor because the standard is too inherently subjective, but rather because use of an 
“outrageousness” metric “would enable a single community to use the authority of the state 
to confine speech within its own notions of propriety”). 
 101. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
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commitment to the freedom of speech and of the press, on the one hand, with a 
commitment to safeguarding privacy and dignity values, on the other. 
Without belaboring the point, the outcome in Phelps would likely have been 
very different outside the United States. For example, the House of Lords (now the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom)102 has held that supermodel Naomi 
Campbell, could recover damages associated with publication of a photograph of 
her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, in the heart of London, even though 
Ms. Campbell was standing on a public street, plainly visible to any passersby.103 
Thus, in the United Kingdom, even a public figure, standing on a public street, can 
possess a legally protected interest in privacy and nondisclosure. 
Along similar lines, the European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) 
has held that Article 8 of the European Convention protects a right of privacy held 
by a public official (a person in line to the throne of Monaco), in public places and 
while at public events.104 Princess Caroline of Monaco is certainly a public figure, 
even if she is not a public official, yet she nevertheless has an equal claim to the 
protection of her privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The European Court explained that the freedom of speech and the press did not 
have any necessary priority over the right of privacy.105 Citing and quoting a 
resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European 
Court noted “the importance of every person’s right to privacy, and of the right to 
freedom of expression, [i]s fundamental,” but also emphasized that this does not 
mean that freedom of expression must always take precedence regardless of the 
precise context.106 Rather, because these fundamental rights “are of equal value” it 
is not possible simply to find that speech and press rights will routinely overbear 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Jess Bravin, A U.K. Court Without the Wigs—New 
Supreme Bench, Patterned on America’s, Stirs Debate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2009, at A1 
(reporting that “[t]his month, the U.K. replaced its Law Lords—a committee of noblemen 
that served as the highest tribunal for much of Britain—with the new Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom,” patterned on the Supreme Court of the United States and noting that 
“[f]or the first time, the U.K.’s highest court is fully separated, American-style, from 
Parliament and its legislative function”). 
 103. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 457 (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
 104. See Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 53920/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 5–6, 
¶¶ 10–17, 28–29, ¶¶ 76–78 (2005). The publication of three sets of photographs was at issue 
in Von Hannover, including photographs of Princess Caroline having lunch at a French 
restaurant with an actor, riding a horse, with her children, shopping, riding a bicycle, skiing, 
playing tennis, and at a beach. See id. at 5–6, ¶¶ 10–17. 
 105. Id. at 25, ¶ 58 (holding that “[t]hat protection of private life has to be balanced 
against the freedom of expression”); id. at 25, ¶ 60 (noting that the European Court of 
Human Rights has “had to balance the protection of private life against the freedom of 
expression” in several cases presenting a conflict between these interests). 
 106. Id. at 18–19, ¶ 42 (citing and quoting Resolution 1165, clause 11 (1998) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy); see also id. at 24–
25, ¶¶ 58–60 (holding that when privacy interests conflict with free speech and free press 
rights, which the European Convention also expressly protects, the European Court must 
balance these interests against each other taking into account the purpose and proper scope 
of all three fundamental rights). 
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privacy interests.107 Moreover, even celebrities and socialites “enjoy a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of protection of and respect for their private life.”108 
The European Court rejected the notion that the rights of free speech and a free 
press should control with respect to publication of the photographs at issue: 
The Court considers that a fundamental distinction needs to be made 
between reporting facts—even controversial ones—capable of 
contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in 
the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the 
private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not 
exercise official functions.109 
Because “the sole purpose [of publishing the photographs] was to satisfy the 
curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the applicant’s private 
life, [publication of the photographs] cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate 
of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public.”110 
Given this reasoning and the limited scope of free expression and free press 
rights—rights limited essentially to matters directly associated with democratic 
self-government—it necessarily followed that Princess Caroline’s privacy claim 
trumped the media’s speech and press claims.111 “[T]he decisive factor in balancing 
the protection of private life against freedom of expression should lie in the 
contribution that the published photos and articles make to a debate of general 
interest.”112 A mere “commercial interest” in publishing photographs and articles 
“must, in the Court’s view, yield to [Princess Caroline’s] right to the effective 
protection of her private life.”113 Thus, Germany had a duty under the European 
Convention to provide legal protection to Princess Caroline against the German 
media outlets that sought to publish the photographs.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. Id. at 19, ¶ 42 (quoting and citing Resolution 1165, clause 11 (1998) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy). The Council of 
Europe is the organization from which the European Court receives its mandate and judicial 
authority. Its membership includes virtually all nations in Western and Eastern Europe, as 
well as Turkey. For an excellent overview of the European Court and the European 
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Court, see THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1–94 
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 108. Von Hannover, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 27, ¶ 69. 
 109. Id. at 26, ¶ 63. 
 110. Id. at 27, ¶ 65. 
 111. See id. at 26–29, ¶ 61–78. 
 112. Id. at 28, ¶ 76. 
 113. Id. at 28, ¶ 77. 
 114. See id. at 29, ¶ 78 (holding that “in the Court’s opinion the criteria established by the 
domestic courts were not sufficient to ensure the effective protection of the applicant’s 
private life and she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a ‘legitimate 
expectation’ of protection of her private life”). Von Hannover thus involves a positive 
obligation on the part of Germany to regulate private behavior more effectively to secure 
privacy interests in contemporary society. The European Court acknowledged this aspect of 
the dispute, noting that signatories to the European Convention incur legal obligations that 
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To be sure, it is certainly true that the European Convention contains an express 
clause securing a right of privacy. Article 8 provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.115 
In this respect, then, the European Court was working against a legal backdrop that 
differs from the U.S. Constitution. And, when two express constitutional rights 
conflict, some sort of accommodation, usually through balancing, must be made.116 
Nevertheless, one would be affording too much explanatory force to text to 
suggest that the presence of Article 8 explains fully the differences between Phelps, 
on the one hand, and Von Hannover, on the other. These rules reflect deep-seated 
cultural values in the United States and in Europe. In the United States, a pervasive 
distrust of government helps to sustain a regime of near-absolute protection for the 
freedom of speech, whereas in the rest of the world, citizens repose more trust, 
more reflexively, in government and its agents, and accordingly tolerate higher 
levels of government regulation of speech.117 
My point in discussing the displacement of tort law to advance free speech 
values in the United States is to demonstrate that even if we could sort out the 
many difficult and pressing definitional issues that plague the concept of privacy, 
we might well find that, once the dust settles, fundamental and irreconcilable 
differences remain that simply cannot be bridged. In the United States, the free 
speech project enjoys if not an absolute priority, then something very close to it. It 
is quite doubtful that the federal or state governments could enact and enforce rules 
that require individuals to observe mandatory civility norms. By way of contrast, 
provisions like Article 8 arguably require signatories of the European Convention 
to maintain legal rules that adequately safeguard the privacy rights not only of 
ordinary people, but of politicians and movie stars as well. 
In this sense, then, although privacy might well be a universal value, substantial 
and probably insurmountable obstacles exist to working out a set of rules that 
would operationalize the concept transnationally. We can all agree that privacy is 
important and should be protected, but from that point forward, the sledding will be 
very heavy indeed. 
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 115. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, 
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 117. See Krotoszynski, Questioning the Value of Dissent, supra note 56, at 213, 219–29. 
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At the same time, however, simply agreeing to disagree seems an unacceptable 
solution to the problem of conflicting human rights norms, in that simply ignoring 
the different relevant weights and priorities will lead different jurisdictions to 
afford or withhold protection for speech and press that originates in one place (say 
the United States), but has significant effects in another (say Germany or France). 
A glaring, indeed compelling, need exists for clearer shared rules regarding both 
the scope of privacy (dignity) rights and also greater clarity about appropriate 
jurisdictional lines for enforcing those rules. 
Although the claim is certainly subject to objection, rethinking and perhaps 
disaggregating the concept of privacy into more discrete and easily definable 
packets or sticks of rights might help point the way to a shared solution. Just as 
property is not used as a generic legal construct, free and clear of particularized 
applications, so too privacy is a concept that cries out for specificity regarding the 
precise interests the concept encompasses and also the scope of those interests. We 
should think about privacy not as a single thing or unitary whole, but rather as a 
disaggregated bundle of sticks, various and sundry discrete interests, that all in one 
way or another help to secure legitimate claims to autonomy, nondisclosure, and 
self-definition. 
IV. THE NOMENCLATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE: PRIVACY AS 
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY AS COMMUNITY RESPECT 
Just as the public/private distinction helps to inform the framing of privacy in 
the United States and in Europe, the concept of autonomy as privacy, rather than 
human dignity, seems to reflect important cultural differences between the United 
States and the wider world. These differences, moreover, also seem to implicate the 
polity’s overall trust in government to use discretionary censorial powers wisely 
and fairly—rather than arbitrarily and unjustly. 
In general, in the United States we speak of a right of privacy, rather than a right 
of human dignity118 or a right to the free development of the personality.119 This is 
not accidental. Although instances exist of the U.S. Supreme Court invoking 
“dignity” as an aspect of constitutionally protected liberty,120 these are the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. See GRUNDGESETZFÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. 
 119. Id. art. 2(1). 
 120. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices for us to 
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
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but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”); see also Leslie Meltzer Henry, 
The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 171–72 (2011) (noting that the 
Supreme Court’s “use of dignity is . . . on the rise” but cautioning that “its importance, 
meaning, and function are commonly presupposed but rarely articulated”). Professor Henry 
argues that “few concepts dominate modern constitutional jurisprudence more than dignity 
does without appearing in the Constitution.” Id. at 172. This may well be true, but the 
emergence of dignity as a constitutionally relevant construct in majority opinions is a recent 
phenomenon and it is unclear whether a majority of the Justices will continue to embrace 
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exceptions that prove the more general rule; rights, in the United States, for the 
most part belong to individuals and not groups. The nomenclature of privacy 
reflects a legal and cultural focus on the individual’s ability to claim a sphere of 
autonomy—a realm of private action that cannot justly be regulated by the state.121 
By way of contrast, in other industrial democracies, the conceptualization of 
human rights often has a more collective, or communal, cast.122 This does not mean 
that individuals do not possess or exercise rights, but rather that rights are 
something that the society as a whole conveys not only to the individual but also to 
minority groups (whether defined by race, ethnicity, language, religion, or some 
other characteristic that makes a group seem “other” from the perspective of the 
dominant group within the society). Moreover, the recognition of group interests as 
constitutional interests can have important effects on the scope of rights when 
individuals attempt to exercise rights, such as the freedom of speech, in ways that 
impose significant costs on particular groups. Thus, constitutional recognition of 
rights as inhering in a group or community can mean a reduced scope for human 
rights as a means of empowering and enabling individual autonomy. 
Germany provides an instructive example. Article 1 of the Basic Law provides 
that “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty 
of all state authority.”123 This obligation is paramount and when dignity conflicts 
with other fundamental rights, the German Federal Constitutional Court, the 
highest judicial entity in Germany, will give priority to securing and advancing 
human dignity. This commitment to human dignity is buttressed by the right to free 
development of the human personality, a human right secured in Article 2 of the 
Basic Law.124 These two rights, working in tandem, support a rich jurisprudence 
that secures the dignity interests of individuals, but also of groups within 
contemporary German society. The concept of dignity, not unlike “the Force” in 
Star Wars lore, plays a comprehensive animating role in German human rights 
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believes, however, that the concept of dignity presently does important independent 
jurisprudential work in contemporary Supreme Court decisions and will likely continue to do 
so. See id. at 181 (“The Court’s repeated appeals to dignity, particularly in majority opinions, 
appear to parallel its greater willingness to proffer dignity as a substantive value animating 
our constitutional rights.”). 
 121. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992) (joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 111, ¶ 29 (1992) (noting that 
“it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of privacy] to an ‘inner circle’ in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the 
outside world” and holding that “[r]espect for private life must also comprise to a certain 
degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings”). 
 123. BASIC LAW, supra note 118, art.1(1). 
 124. Id. art. 2(1) (“Every person shall have the right to free development of his 
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the 
constitutional order or the moral law.”). 
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jurisprudence: everyone has a right to dignity and all groups have a right to dignity 
as well. 
The commitment to protecting an individual person’s dignitarian interests is 
much broader in Germany than in the United States, which helps to provide useful 
perspective on the scope of dignity in German law. All persons, including 
incumbent politicians and celebrities, have an equal claim to the protection of their 
constitutional right to dignity. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld an 
injunction blocking distribution of a humor magazine that featured a parody of the 
German equivalent of a state governor as a rutting pig.125 The cartoon, the court 
said, denied the incumbent politician his right to human dignity, a right that has 
paramount value under Germany’s Basic Law. 
Significantly, the concept of dignity protects both individuals and groups within 
German society. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court has upheld criminal 
prohibitions against Holocaust Denial, or the “Auschwitz Lie,” because, in its view, 
there is simply no value in false speech about a matter of historical record.126 This 
decision also reflects core concerns rooted in protecting the dignity of those 
murdered in the Holocaust, as well as their descendants. 
Rejecting the defendant’s claim that a commitment to respecting the freedom of 
speech must, of necessity, encompass the right publicly to deny the Holocaust, the 
Federal Constitutional Court held that false factual assertions “‘cannot contribute 
anything to the constitutionally presupposed formation of opinion’” and, 
accordingly, do not enjoy any protection as “speech” under Article 5(1) of the 
Basic Law (the German constitutional analogue to the First Amendment).127 The 
court explained that “‘[v]iewed from this angle, incorrect information is not an 
interest that merits protection.’”128 
Freedom of speech in Germany does not extend to anti-Semitic speech, to 
antidemocratic speech, or to speech that transgresses civility norms designed to 
secure personal honor, reputation, and dignity.129 Moreover, this protection is not 
limited to individuals, but extends to entire groups, such as persons serving in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 3, 1987, 75 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 369, 1988 (Ger.) (Strauss 
Caricature Case), reprinted in 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT—FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT—FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PART 2, 
420, 420–21 (D.C. Umbach ed., I. Fraser et al. trans., 1998) [hereinafter DECISIONS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]; see KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 104–18 
(discussing the balance that German constitutional law seeks to maintain between dignity 
and free speech and noting that, in circumstances where these interests squarely conflict with 
each other, safeguarding human dignity interests will trump protecting free speech). 
 126. See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 126–27. But cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, 
Where’s the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 
1095–1100 (2008) (arguing that sound reasons exist for prohibiting government from 
proclaiming historical truths and defending such truths through criminal sanctions and 
arguing, from a practical perspective, that such regulations are not likely to convince those 
who deny the Holocaust and “may have the unintended and paradoxical consequence of 
strengthening the beliefs of Holocaust deniers, rather than weakening them”). 
 127. KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 127. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 93–130. 
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armed forces or members of a particular racial or religious group. The right to 
protection against outrageous verbal assault is both individual and communal. 
The Tucholsky case130 also helps to demonstrate the communitarian conception 
of the right to human dignity in Germany. A pacifist group, opposed to all forms of 
war and military aggression, adopted and propagated the phrase “Soldiers are 
Murderers” as a slogan; these protests then became the subject of a civil proceeding 
to suppress distribution of the group’s printed protest materials via an injunction. 
The phrase had been coined by Kurt Tucholsky, a writer and political satirist who 
had opposed the Nazi Party’s rise to power in the 1930s; his iteration of the idea 
was the slogan “Soldiers are Murderers.”131 
The question presented for the German Federal Constitutional Court was 
whether the phrase “Soldiers are Murderers” constituted protected political speech 
or, instead, transgressed the dignity interests of those serving—and who had 
served—in Germany’s military ranks. The lower courts found that the phrase 
demeaned the dignity of those serving in Germany’s armed forces and prohibited 
use of the slogan in public discourse.132 
The Federal Constitutional Court reversed, holding that the phrase, at least in the 
particular context presented, constituted protected political speech under Article 
5(1) of the Basic Law.133 It reached this conclusion because the phrase was not 
directed toward any particular soldier or group of soldiers.134 “Instead, [the would-
be anti-war protestors] expressed a judgment about soldiers and about the 
profession of soldier, which in some circumstances compels the killing of other 
people.”135 
The Federal Constitutional Court was very clear, however, in stating that had the 
protestors directed the phrase at either any identifiable solider or group of soldiers, 
an injunction against distribution of the speech would have been consistent with the 
free speech guarantee of Article 5136—and perhaps even legally required to protect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 10, 1995, 
93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 266, 1996 (Ger.) 
(Tucholsky Case (Soldiers are Murderers Case)), reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 659. 
 131. Id. at 670; see also Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: 
A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1553 (2003) (noting that the slogan 
“ha[s] a long pedigree in German history as it was the creation of the writer Kurt Tucholsky, 
an Anti-Nazi pacifist of the 1930s who was stripped of his German citizenship in 1933”). 
 132. For a discussion of the procedural background of the case and the lower courts’ 
rulings, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 388–89 (2d ed. 1997). 
 133. Tucholsky, 93 BVERFGE 266, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 676 (“The statements for which the 
complainants were sentenced for defamation enjoy the protection of Art. 5(1), first sentence, 
Basic Law.”). 
 134. See id. at 676–77. 
 135. Id. at 677. 
 136. Id. (“The complainants have not through their statements that soldiers are murderers 
or potential murderers asserted that particular soldiers had in the past committed a murder. 
Instead, they expressed a judgment about soldiers and about the profession of soldier, which 
in some circumstances compels the killing of other people.” (emphasis added)). The Federal 
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the right of human dignity set forth in Article 1.137 This is so because in Germany, 
the state has not merely an obligation to refrain itself from violating the Basic Law, 
but also has an affirmative, positive obligation to create social conditions within the 
polity that secure fundamental rights more generally.138 Thus, it is not enough that 
the government itself respects the dignity of all persons; instead, the government 
has a duty to create a social environment in which all citizens enjoy the right to 
human dignity within the general community. 
To be sure, the Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 
state itself does not possess a constitutionally cognizable interest in dignity (unlike 
all human beings). Even so, the state has a duty and responsibility to ensure that 
                                                                                                                 
Constitutional Court explained that the convictions under review impermissibly rested on “a 
value judgment, not an assertion of fact.” Id.; see also Guy E. Carmi, Dignity Versus Liberty: 
The Two Western Cultures of Free Speech, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 277, 336–37 n.419 (2008) 
(noting the Federal Constitutional Court “went to considerable lengths to interpret the 
‘soldiers are murderers’ slogan, as not having been directed at specific soldiers, or the entire 
German Army. It is apparent that a clear and unequivocal statement that ‘all currently 
enlisted German soldiers are murderers’ is fully punishable under German law”); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, 
Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in 
Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2004) (“[T]he Federal Constitutional Court has 
upheld free speech claims only when the personal insult was not targeted at any particular 
individual.”); Rosenfeld, supra note 131, at 1554 (noting that the Federal Constitutional 
Court afforded the phrase protection because “the statements involved amounted to 
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion rather than to the spreading of false facts”). 
One should note that the Tucholsky decision, and an earlier decision by a panel of the 
Federal Constitutional Court that reached the same conclusion, were highly controversial and 
politically unpopular with many German politicians, as well as the German general public. 
See KOMMERS, supra note 132, at 392–95 (discussing the highly negative reaction to the 
Tucholsky decisions and proposed federal legislation to ban the use of Tucholsky’s slogan). 
 137. See Tucholsky, 93 BVERFGE 266, reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 677–79 (holding that the Basic Law’s protection 
of human dignity and personal honor generally requires an effective remedy if a particular 
soldier’s personal behavior or conduct had been falsely characterized in a public statement). 
The outcome in this case turned on the impersonal—and non-targeted—nature of the phrase; 
had the phrase “Soldiers are Murderers” been of and concerning a particular soldier, or 
group of soldiers, the speech would not have been protected and instead the Basic Law 
would have required the government to provide protection of the soldiers’ dignity interest. 
See supra note 136. 
 138. See Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 797, 813 (1997) (describing the doctrine of secondary effect in Germany and 
noting “there is effectively no difference in the standard of review applied by the 
Constitutional Court to purely private or public law disputes”); Peter E. Quint, Free Speech 
and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 273–74 (1989) 
(noting that “[u]nder the German Basic Law, however, the fact that a certain dispute of 
private law lies beyond where the state action line would be drawn under the United States 
Constitution has no particular meaning” and that “the German constitution continues to have 
an impact in cases in which no state action would be found under American law”); see also 
Krotoszynski, supra note 136, at 1561–62 (discussing the absence of a state action doctrine 
in Germany). For a very thoughtful discussion of how German constitutional theory justifies 
application of constitutional values to disputes between purely private parties, see Quint, 
supra, at 262–76. 
2013] THE POLYSEMY OF PRIVACY 911 
 
public support for the institutions of government does not fall to a level that would 
create a risk to the survival of those institutions. Hence, although the Basic Law’s 
free speech guarantee privileges defacing a German flag or mocking the national 
anthem with a parody, a point exists at which calling the symbols of the nation into 
scorn or contempt might run up against the Basic Law’s commitment to preserving 
the project of democratic self-government.139 When and if expressive activity 
reaches that point, the Federal Constitutional Court will withdraw constitutional 
protection from the speech in order to safeguard the institutions of democratic self-
government. On the other hand, and as noted above, persons holding government 
offices, unlike the state itself, enjoy constitutional protection of their interest in 
dignity. 
By way of contrast, in the United States more often than not we tend to frame 
human rights in terms of the individual rather than the group. For example, in the 
context of the Equal Protection Clause, the fact that a legislature composed 
primarily of white men adopts an affirmative action program benefiting women or 
racial minorities is quite irrelevant to the program’s constitutional status; a white 
man who believes himself to have been disadvantaged by the program would be 
quite free to object to it in federal court. Simply put, equal protection rights belong 
to individuals, and not to groups.140 
This construction of human rights as being rooted in protections for the 
individual, rather than for groups, also finds expression in U.S. domestic free 
speech law, albeit in a negative way. Not since 1952 in the Beauharnais case141 has 
the Supreme Court of the United States sustained criminal group libel laws.142 Prior 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 
7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 298, 1990 
(Ger.) (German National Anthem Case), reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 450; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 278, 1990 (Ger.) (Flag Desecration Case), 
reprinted in DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 125, at 437. 
See generally KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 51, at 117–18. 
 140. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining that the application of skepticism, congruence, and consistency rules for equal 
protection review of all government race-based classifications “all derive from the basic 
principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not 
groups” (emphasis in original)). Cases permitting men to challenge gender-based 
classifications that benefit women also reflect this approach. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (“That this statutory policy discriminates 
against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the 
standard of review.”). This approach reflects the notion that fundamental rights belong to 
individuals, not groups, in the United States. 
 141. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
 142. Id. at 261–64. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter explained: 
In the face of this history [of racial violence in Illinois] and its frequent obligato 
of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say 
that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or 
malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and 
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to Brandenburg v. Ohio,143 however, states and the federal government were free to 
create and enforce civil and criminal “group libel” laws. These laws permitted legal 
sanctions to be applied to individuals or groups who libeled a particular set of 
individuals based on, for example, race, religion, or gender. Brandenburg, 
however, in conjunction with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,144 rejected the legal 
underpinnings of the doctrine of group libel. The offensiveness of speech does not, 
as a general matter, affect its constitutionally protected status; nor does the 
possibility of speech creating general hostility or social unrest within the 
community serve as a controlling legal consideration that may overbear a free 
speech claim. 
Brandenburg holds that only speech that presents an immediate risk of inciting 
disorder or violence may be proscribed consistently with the First Amendment,145 
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan protects true speech virtually absolutely and 
affords even false speech significant protection when it relates to a public official, a 
public figure, or a matter of public concern.146 In tandem, these two precedents 
make it virtually impossible to afford groups protection from targeted insult. 
                                                                                                                 
by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those to whom it 
was presented. 
Id. at 261. He added: 
It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our 
authority in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the Illinois 
legislature may warrantably believe that a man’s job and his educational 
opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the 
reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as 
on his own merits. This being so, we are precluded from saying that speech 
concededly punishable when immediately directed at individuals cannot be 
outlawed if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the 
affiliated individual may be inextricably involved. 
Id. at 263. 
 143. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
 144. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 145. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that “the constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 146. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a 
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory 
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”). This approach has the effect of affording significant 
constitutional protection to objectively false statements of fact. The rationale for this result is 
the need for adequate breathing space for a free press: “that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” Id. at 270. 
Subsequent cases have broadly construed the Sullivan principle to apply also to public 
figures and to coverage of matters of public concern that do not involve either a public 
official or a public figure. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 771–77 
(1986) (surveying the relevant precedents in the Sullivan line and discussing the application 
of the Sullivan rule in various contexts including cases involving public officials, public 
figures, and private figures involved in a matter of public concern). 
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Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell147 removes any residual doubts about this 
question (particularly when read in conjunction with Snyder v. Phelps). In Hustler, 
the Supreme Court held protected a fake Campari ad in Hustler magazine that 
suggested the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s first sexual encounter involved a drunken 
rendezvous in an outhouse with his mother—thus demonstrating with convincing 
clarity that we have no conception of personal dignity or honor in our legal 
system.148 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained: 
“Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an 
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose 
liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the 
basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An “outrageousness” 
standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages 
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse 
emotional impact on the audience.149 
This notion that intentionally outrageous speech enjoys protection, even when 
specifically calculated to inflict maximum emotional harm,150 privileges the 
individual bomb-thrower over his victims. It represents a radical break from the 
current constitutional practice of most other industrial democracies, including 
Canada, France, Germany, and South Africa—all nations where the government 
may create and enforce group-based rights that help to advance a project of 
pluralism and multiculturalism. 
Once again, the distrust thesis appears to offer a plausible explanation for this 
disjunction in both the theory and the operationalization of fundamental human 
rights. If one believes government to be at best inept and at worst corrupt, vesting it 
with the power to create and enforce group-based rights could be seen a very bad 
idea. Some groups, inevitably, will enjoy more robust protection than others (i.e., 
groups with political clout). Instead of redressing political, economic, and social 
inequality, the regime of group-protection will simply exacerbate the preexisting 
inequalities; it will magnify and amplify rather than eradicate them. Thus, from a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 148. See id. at 47–48, 54–57. 
 149. Id. at 55. 
 150. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that, when asked 
by plaintiff’s counsel, during a sworn deposition, if he was trying to harm Reverend 
Falwell’s reputation for integrity, Larry Flynt responded that his intention was not to merely 
“harm” Falwell’s reputation, but rather was “to assassinate it”), rev’d sub nom. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL 
V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 59–60 (1988); Boyd C. Farnum, Note, 
Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, the New York Times 
Actual Malice Standard, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 63 IND. L.J. 877, 
877 (1988) (reporting that Flynt’s motive in publishing the parody Campari ad was “to 
assassinate” Falwell’s reputation); Post, supra note 100, at 605, 609–10 (same). Larry 
Flynt’s lawyers prevailed on him to offer a better defense while testifying during the trial 
itself; at the trial, Flynt declined to repeat his earlier deposition testimony and instead said 
that he did not intend the parody to have “any effect” on Falwell’s reputation. See SMOLLA, 
supra, at 138–39. 
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U.S. perspective, a government empowered to declare political truths is too 
dangerous to be tolerated.151 
The U.S. approach to free speech theory plainly reflects a prophylactic rule 
aimed at preventing government from using its authority to perpetuate itself. 
Professor Marty Redish and his coauthor, Elizabeth Cisar, have aptly noted that 
“[a]lthough one may of course debate the scope or meaning of particular 
constitutional provisions, it would be difficult to deny that in establishing their 
complex structure, the Framers were virtually obsessed with a fear—bordering on 
what some might uncharitably describe as paranoia—of the concentration of 
political power.”152 Professor Michael Asimow concurs, noting that “[a] 
generalized distrust of government officials and government power is a recurrent 
strain in American history.”153 In an earlier writing, I have observed that “[t]o a 
remarkable degree, Americans tend to be hostile toward government and its 
motives.”154 
The root causes of this skepticism toward government and its agents is difficult 
to diagnose, but my own view is that it relates to the remarkable pluralism of the 
United States: “the United States was, in large measure, a nation built not on ties of 
religion, ethnic kinship, or even geography, but rather on immigration.”155 Given 
that we cannot know, in general, whether our group (however defined) will 
command the levers of government power at any given place or time, it is entirely 
rational to respond by seeking to limit the power of government to impact our daily 
lives. By way of contrast, “[i]n a nation sharing a common ethnic, religious, and 
cultural heritage, trust in government might well come more naturally, and be held 
more readily, than in a nation built of immigrants that still features significant 
divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, region, urbanization, and culture.”156 
In such a place, permitting government to establish civility rules, including rules 
designed to protect privacy or personal honor, will raise the specter of these rules 
being used strategically to benefit some groups at the expense of others.157 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. See Lidsky, supra note 126, at 1096–97 (arguing that protection of false speech 
relates to the dangers inherent in a government empowered to censor speech and declare 
historical truth, rather than in the objective value of false statements of fact). 
 152. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for 
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991). 
 153. Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
653, 662 (2007). He adds that “[a] substantial number of Americans suspect government 
officials and agencies of meddlesomeness, incompetence, or corruption.” Id. at 663; see also 
GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 319 
(1999) (suggesting that we foolishly believe that “[i]nefficiency is to be our safeguard 
against despotism” because we mistakenly believe “that a government unable to do much of 
anything will be unable to oppress us”). 
 154. Krotoszynski, The Shot (Not) Heard ’Round the World, supra note 56, at 28. 
 155. Id. at 31. 
 156. Id. at 33. 
 157. See Post, supra note 100, at 624–32 (arguing that permitting the imposition of tort 
liability based on a standard of “outrageousness” would permit empowered groups within the 
community to silence less empowered groups within the community through a de facto 
heckler’s veto and therefore should be rejected in order to ensure that all communities enjoy 
equal dignity under the law). I think that Professor Post has this right: if a choice must be 
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Moreover, the whole purpose of the First Amendment subtly shifts: rather than 
serving as a means of protecting speech because of its social value or worth, it 
serves instead as another structural bulwark against the perceived risk of tyranny. 
Speech does not merit protection because it always and invariably produces social 
benefits that offset its social costs, but rather because a government broadly 
empowered to regulate speech is also a government empowered to perpetuate itself 
at the expense of the citizenry. 
Thus, as Professor Lyrissa Lidsky observes, “even if First Amendment theory’s 
faith in the fundamental rationality of public discourse is misplaced, distrust of 
government still may be a strong enough basis, standing alone, to warrant declaring 
any attempt to punish Holocaust denial unconstitutional.”158 A prophylactic 
concern with the dangers of government censorship, rather than a belief that racist, 
sexist, or homophobic speech has value, arguably undergirds the U.S. approach. 
Moreover, as Lidsky correctly notes, “[p]ast governmental attempts to ‘prescribe 
what shall be orthodox’ have resulted in suppression of truth and enshrinement of 
error.”159 
Even though no reasonable person disbelieves known historical facts, we 
nevertheless deny government the power to declare “truth” out of a fear that such a 
power would inevitably be used for crass partisan reasons; better to protect obvious 
falsehoods than to risk the suppression of inconvenient truths. Mandatory civility 
norms, designed to protect personal privacy or honor, using standards such as the 
offensiveness, outrageousness, or intrusiveness of speech, would create a powerful 
means of censoring, via the civil law, unpopular speakers and groups.160 Thus, the 
U.S. approach reflects a profound skepticism about the ability of government to use 
its power to censor wisely, even if the outcome of adopting this approach permits 
gross intrusions on undoubtedly legitimate dignity interests. 
To be clear, having Nazis march in Skokie, Illinois, to terrorize and demean 
Holocaust survivors is undeniably a bad thing;161 the pain and mental anguish 
associated with such targeted and intentionally offensive speech is clearly beyond 
peradventure.162 But the question of how speech affects group-based dignity 
interests is simply not relevant to contemporary First Amendment analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
made between protecting only some groups within our polity (namely, those already 
enjoying social and political privilege) or protecting no groups, surely it is more logical to 
level down than to attempt to level up. 
 158. Lidsky, supra note 126, at 1097. 
 159. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
 160. See Post, supra note 100, at 624–25. 
 161. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. 
Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); cf. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND 
NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997) (arguing that 
protection of group-based dignitarian interests should be deemed fully consistent with a 
robust protection of the freedom of speech). 
 162. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, 
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134–35, 179–81 (1982) (arguing that 
“an independent tort action for racial insults is both permissible and necessary” and setting 
forth the proposed elements of such a cause of action); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2332 (1989) (arguing 
that a formalized “legal response to racist speech is required” because of “the structural 
reality of racism in America”); see also MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, 
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Viewed from a global perspective, these concerns seem strikingly misplaced, if 
not entirely paranoid. Germany, for example, reasonably believes that a 
government empowered to punish those who vilify Jews and deny the Holocaust 
simply does not present a risk of totalitarian oppression; rather, under the German 
risk calculus, would-be fascists constitute the greater and more pressing risk to the 
existing free and democratic social order (a risk that must be checked through the 
use of government power). Objective facts exist, and there is little value in 
permitting misguided individuals to pollute the marketplace of ideas by 
disseminating objectively false speech, particularly when the speech at issue 
degrades and demeans various segments of German society. 
Moreover, given the importance of making a pluralistic society function 
effectively, certain kinds of untruths impose significantly higher social costs than 
others. From this vantage point, government has an entirely legitimate, if not 
compelling, interest in enacting and strictly enforcing speech regulations that help 
to secure and maintain a well-functioning multicultural polity. To permit an 
individual to exercise fundamental rights in ways that impose tremendous social 
costs simply cannot be justified, and a democratically elected government may 
legitimately exercise the coercive power of the state to suppress the dissemination 
of such ideas. 
In sum, a polity makes a critical choice when it decides whether to frame the 
vesting and exercise of human rights only in the individual, rather than in the 
individual and also the collective. A communitarian approach to the creation and 
enforcement of human rights will lead to very different outcomes in an important 
range of cases than will framing and enforcing human rights solely from the 
perspective of an autonomous individual. “Privacy” is a concept that reflects an 
individual-centric conception of rights, whereas “dignity” implicates the broader 
community, both with respect to the vesting of rights and also with respect to the 
balancing of conflicting human rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy is a concept that can and does bear multiple meanings. In the United 
States, privacy is primarily a set of important autonomy interests that run against 
the state, rather than a right to proprietary control over important personal 
information. In thinking about the legal importance of privacy in a transatlantic 
context, privacy’s status as a polysemous legal construct must be taken into 
consideration. In a very real sense, privacy in the EU and privacy in the United 
States have very little to do with each other. Teasing out why this is so, and why 
Americans are so indifferent to the commodification of their personal data, is a 
question worthy and deserving of sustained consideration by legal academics on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
                                                                                                                 
RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (offering a variety 
of theoretical, philosophical, and practical arguments in favor of stronger government 
restrictions against hate speech). For a recent treatment of the issues and arguments favoring 
regulation of so-called “hate speech,” see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 
(2012). 
2013] THE POLYSEMY OF PRIVACY 917 
 
At the same time, in some specific contexts, such as tort law, where a shared 
commitment to protecting privacy as an important social and cultural value exists, 
significant cultural and legal differences between the United States and Europe 
make creating and implementing a shared human rights vision difficult, if not 
impossible. In particular, the U.S. commitment to elevating expressive freedom 
over other important social values, such as privacy, dignity, and personal honor, 
renders a common approach to safeguarding privacy in the tort context a practical 
impossibility. The U.S. approach is not unconsidered, however; a pervasive distrust 
of government leads courts to disallow efforts to control speech—both through 
direct regulations that incorporate content or viewpoint limitations (e.g., a ban on 
hate speech, restrictions on minors’ access to violent video games, or depictions of 
animal cruelty)163 and also through more indirect means, such as use of the 
common law of tort as applied by civil juries.164 
If the current trend in the United States continues, there may in fact be precious 
little legal space for the use of tort law to safeguard privacy or reputational interests 
more generally if the offending speech relates, in any conceivable way, to a matter 
of public concern.165 It seems equally clear, however, that in Europe the freedom of 
expression often loses out when the state seeks to safeguard privacy, including 
dignity, reputation, and personal honor. The definitional problems present a serious 
impediment to a transnational dialogue about privacy rights. The operational 
problems, on the other hand, seem to present an insurmountable obstacle to a 
common understanding of the right of privacy (and particularly in the tort context), 
unless the right is defined so abstractly as to be virtually meaningless—a mere 
platitude. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently and reliably rejected government 
programs that rely on content- or viewpoint-based regulations of speech. See Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (rejecting a California law restricting 
childrens’ access to violent video games as an impermissible form of content 
discrimination); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (invalidating limits on 
access to physicans’ prescription data, adopted to curb aggressive marketing techniques by 
pharmaceutical representatives, because the regulations constituted content and viewpoint 
discrimination); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (invalidating a federal law 
that banned depictions of animal cruelty because the law discriminated against particular 
content); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a 
municipal ordinance against hate speech because it constituted a form of content and 
viewpoint discrimination). But cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge brought against a content-based federal law 
that prohibited providing “material support or resources” to a terrorist organization and 
holding that the statute passed strict scrutiny by advancing a compelling government interest 
in a narrowly tailored way). The Humanitarian Law Project decision constitutes the 
exception that proves the general rule (i.e., that content-based restrictions on speech 
presumptively violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
 164. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 U.S. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (disallowing the imposition of 
civil liability under state tort law where such liability would burden constitutionally 
protected speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) (same). 
 165. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668, 2672 (rejecting privacy-based justifications offered 
by Vermont in defense of a state law banning the sale of physician prescription data to 
pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes). 
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Moreover, this conflict in fundamental values will prove to be of more than 
merely academic interest.166 Anyone publishing books, magazines, or newspapers, 
or making content available in Europe via the Internet, has cause to be concerned 
over the radically different accommodations of privacy, on the one hand, and 
expressive freedoms, on the other. Given that important cultural traits help to 
ground and explain these differences, coming to a common understanding will be, 
at best, quite difficult. If we were to abjure “privacy” and even “dignity” in favor of 
more discrete characterizations of the particular liberty interests at stake, we could 
at least begin a meaningful dialogue about our precise differences in both theory 
and law and why they exist. 
To the extent that the use of high-sounding, but vague, human rights 
nomenclature permits judges, lawyers, and even ordinary citizens to talk past each 
other, finding common ground will be the harder for it. Polysemy is not an evil in 
and of itself, but when polysemy impedes the attainment of a workable system of 
global human rights, it becomes essential to find more definite and concrete ways 
of articulating the fundamental interests that we seek to protect from unreasonable 
or unjust government abridgment. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. See Timothy Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging 
Complexities of Transborder Expression, 65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 131 (2012) (observing that 
“[g]lobal channels of speech, press, and association have become tightly interconnected” and 
suggesting that “[g]lobalization, digitization, and the proliferation of media outlets blur the 
lines between domestic- and foreign-speech marketplaces”). Zick argues that “[p]otentially 
harmful domestic, expressive activities increasingly have transborder effects” and posits that 
“[i]n the global theater, increased interconnectivity and the compression of space and time 
will enhance speakers’ ability to communicate offensive and incendiary messages and to 
enter associations with disfavored and potentially dangerous foreign organizations.” Id. at 
186. Obviously, the transborder effects that Zick describes will create a real and pressing 
need for greater efforts to reach a common understanding of how to define and enforce 
expressive freedoms—including speech, press, and assembly—especially in circumstances 
where the exercise of these expressive freedoms conflicts with other constitutional values, 
such as privacy and human dignity. See id. at 131 (“At home, abroad, and in cyberspace, 
citizens increasingly participate in global debates and enter relationships with aliens who are 
located abroad.”). 
